The influence of the dominant scientific style of thinking at the end of the 19th century could be very well felt in the theory of music. Students of music took interest in exploring the physical, psychological or sociological dimensions of music neglecting its essence, its metaphysical reality, in other words, the phenomenal side of music was studied, not the phenomenon itself. In the philosophy of art naturalism, historicism and philosophy of Weltanschauung were dominant (each of these leading inevitably into relativism). Any idea of dialectic of artistic production in the philosophy of art was excluded and in the same time the significance, the range and the possibility of philosophy itself was reduced so that it became no more than a shadowy companion of "omnipotent" science.

Music was just described instead of being thought, and that is the main reason of the dominant subjectivism of all the musical theories of that time. The pure consciousness got lost in the cobweb of phenomena, in the interplay of groundless possibilities caught in the snare of dogmatic belief in rightness of the direct intention (Natürliche Einstellung, intentio recta). However, the discovery of the unreflected subjectivity has had its positive side: the consciousness had discovered in itself the multiplicity of (possible) relations towards absolute knowledge.

Phenomenology at the beginning of the 20th century became, indeed within a very short period of time, a very influential philosophical movement; running counter to the above described line of thought. In spite of having presented itself, at the very beginning, as first and foremost a method, namely eidetic method consisting in immediate intuiting of essences, soon it was recognized as something far more important than a method. It became clear that a new type of philosophy was rising, an original interpretation of the world and its ultimate meaning.

Shortly after phenomenology became dominant in Germany, the first translation of Husserl's Logical Investigations (Logische Untersuchungen, 1900) appeared outside Germany in Russia (1910), where European philosophical thought, for a short period of time, was well accepted. Among the Russian thinkers who were influenced by phenomenology and who have significantly contributed to its development one of the most prominent was Alexei Feodorovich Losev (1893-1988). Losev became quite well-known in philosophical circles soon after he had completed his studies. Philosophy, philology, as well as music, were among his main interests. His life and important works he left behind were permeated by a single question, from a philosophical point of view the most important question, that of eidos, of meaning. He focused on thinking the essence of contemporary music in the line of the inextinguishable pythagorean tradition of thinking music as the ultimate ground of Universe.

His philosophical analyses of music Losev began by a demand for thinking music as something extraspatial, i.e. in its eidos, that is the intuitively given meaningful essence of things, the meaningful form of an object (IV, 428). He uses these expressions in order
to emphasize the unique meaning of music. It is thus clear that the object of his investigation is the ideal musical object. Music itself could neither be (as the psychologists had claimed) an object of a psychological analysis, nor could it be reduced to the analysis of personal experience (Erlebnis) of music; the investigation of music had to reach "the construction of a living object of music in consciousness" (IV, 418).

Losev's conception of musical analysis is typically phenomenological: he asks a question about the essence of music viewed as pure phenomenon, he is not interested in forms of its appearance, but in its ideal form, in music qua music, music as it manifests itself in its essence, in an immediate intuiting of essence (Wesenschau). There is no doubt that this is an ontological point of view, which will be of considerable importance to the thesis of this paper: music in itself is *eidos*, not its representation; if it "represents" anything at all, it is a representation (or better expression) of the hyletic, i.e. naturalistic chaos and of the formlessness of the diverse disposition of things. Thus the phenomenon of music separates itself from the realm of spatio-temporal changes as an object of theoretical contemplation in its essentiality which is, according to Losev, aesthetic, and therefore, in the same time, a-logical (IV, 414). Music deserves special attention due to its opposition to science. Science aims at establishing laws of nature (reality) which are the only object of exploration and possible knowledge. Having applied these laws to reality and confusing abstraction with concretness, science reifies the living world, which becomes viewed as a deterministic dungeon ruled by laws of mechanics that admit no exception. Music becomes an expression of deepest protest against this world of abstraction and laws, eternal "grounds" (IV, 438). Music runs contrary to this interpretation of the world as a huge mechanism governed by laws of science. Music is the world itself, science is but a house of cards. That is why it can be said that neither does music consist of sounds, chords, melody, harmony nor rhythm, but that music simultaneously accumulates all this into a unique form - in an ideal unity. What makes this possible is that music is not governed by static laws of reason, but by permanent, processual laws of coming-to-be (IV, 442), so that music does not represent objects, but it is their essence in which these are originally fused and interwoven.

The pure musical being that becomes the central theme of a true philosophical investigation is, according to Losev, a non-spatial, chaotic, formless being that manifests itself as the ultimate unity (IV, 421). The uttermost consequence of this claim is that the form of music is a form of disorder because, due to its alogical ground, the pure being of music can be understood as the ultimate formlessness and disorderliness. In order to determine as closely as possible the "formula" of pure musical being - the interweaving of everything with everything else, the disappearance of opposites - the *coincidentia oppositorum* (IV, 411-12) it may be said that pure musical being does not express spatial, physical things (objects), but the hyletic essence of these, i.e. what all these have become from, and it is the main reason why a "content" of a piece of music can be expressed only by means of symbolic images. Thus we must not be surprised when we read the

---

1 There is no word “alogical” in Webster’s New World Dictionary. It is coined as an analogy. So, as moral : amoral (amoral = not to be judged by criteria of morality; neither moral nor immoral. Immoral = not in conformity with accepted principles of right or wrong behaviour), thus logical : alogical : illogical (illogical = not logical – using faulty reasoning, therefore alogical = neither logical nor illogical, using different reasoning. Sometimes spelled with a hyphen in order to emphasize the etymology, “a” comes from *alpha privatium*. (Translator’s note)
following lines about the author of *Serbian Rhapsody*, the composer N. A. Rimsky-Korsakov: ‘compared to spatio-temporal objects music is absolute disorder, since it produces no such object’ (IV, 604); it can present the essence of these objects that correspond to the endless number of individual things, but not the object itself and even if it is in a certain relation towards essences and operates with meanings and essences of things, music is different from thinking since it does not intend to cognitively grasp these objects *qua* spatio-temporal entities.

By means of sound one grasps the pure property and the not-yet-objectness of an object; by means of words, an already formed object and its structure. Musical being is, therefore, in its essence formless and it becomes definitively structured by its further development, reaching its own *logos*. Losev can conclude from this that the peak of human creativity is achieved by a musical drama where the primordial formless basis of music reaches the highest point of its meaning (IV, 606). There is no doubt that these ideas represent an original and very specific interpretation of music due to a specific understanding of nature of creativity based on a teleological interpretation of the nature of music by which the meaning of an object has a priority over its appearance. The unity of words and sound becomes possible, according to Losev, only if words start losing their original meaning (Losev would say their original form), this being the case in poetic discourse, in so far it is authentically poetic, that is, in case the discourse being assimilated to music. It is thus understandable that in music the law of identity does not hold.

In comparison to human understanding music is *prima facie* a disorder, a state of anarchy. That is because understanding seeks to explain things avoiding ambiguity and illogicality and music, on the other hand, seems as if it lacks any definite *arché* (principle) and due to that being undescribable in any precise terms, moreover, it seems as if it lacks substantiality so that one may be tempted to say that the essence of music is given only in personal experience. If this is so, if the being that music discloses lacks any fixed logical form, then it must appear to the intellect as a knot of inextricable antinomies.

Losev was inspired to explore the relationship of music and mathematics. In spite of all the differences of these subjects he was convinced, already in the early twenties of the last century, that music can be understood only in the context of what is its utmost difference and what may (in one of the deepest layers of consciousness) mean nearness itself, in other words, that there must be an inner relation between music and logic. A. G. Baumgarten laid the foundations of philosophical aesthetics in the mid XVIII century by distinguishing the spheres of aesthetic and noetic, or aesthetic and logic. Following this line of thought Losev set out further investigations in the realm of logic parallel to that found in the realm of aesthetics. Being aware of the shortcomings of the traditional logic he tried to discover new foundations to it and in these explorations his analyses of music were of considerable significance because music was for him the paradigm of foundation of any possible ground. It is no accident that the very notion of hyletic logic (on which he focused in contrast to formal logic and eidetic logic) contains the word *hyle* (matter) which is traditionally understood as *mē* on (*not being*) *qua* otherness of *eidos*. The hyletic construction of an object in consciousness presupposes properties (categories) of otherness, as a possibility of existence of Other, in realm to
which it becomes possible to construct a concept of eidos *qua* essence (identity, difference, motion and rest, IV, 500-1).

In order to prevent possible misunderstanding, especially considering the relation between music and mathematics (this could be a subject of a separate essay, namely the relation between music and the nature of numbers) in a work titled *Music as a Subject of Logic* in the final part of the chapter *Music and Mathematics* Losev wrote: "all music is in fact form", its rhythm, harmony, etc. determines the complexity and the level of formativity of its content, in the same time emphasizing that music is completely beyond the realm of logical form, that music is "the kingdom of a-logicality and meaninglessness". "Music", wrote Losev, "says a lot being not aware of what is spoken about and this is because it cannot mean anything. More precisely, music speaks of the ineffable, it logically constructs an alogical world, it speaks about the unknown and amorph, about the "elemental otherness of meaning" (IV, 505).

This raises a number of questions concerning theory of music and more generic ones concerning philosophy of music. We may disregard for a moment Losev's usage of basic concepts (and it is obvious that he uses them in a rather special way) but these citations will suffice for us to apprehend what the main problem of his philosophy is, and the problem he is constantly dealing with in the rest of his philosophical writings on music and his incessant endeavour to grasp the essence of music itself, namely the problem of how the world is related to music, and how knowledge is related to music, in other words, whether it is possible to analyse music rationally, i.e. applying logical form. This is a question of utmost importance. We may very well be aware of the fact that it is impossible to comprehend a piece of music by counting notes, or triumphantly finding the origin of some chord. If musicologists do find a connection between, say, a chord from Petrushka with a similar one in Debussy's composition (the one on which the whole *Afternoon of a Faun* is based), or with one in Berg's *Violin Concerto*, how much all this help us find an answer to a question of what music is. In other words: what is the place of music in the world of things and how can it be defined or understood, if at all, in terms of its uniqueness.

It is rightly stated that the musical language Stravinsky's is easy to recognize and it is equally easy to notice the influence of Bach, Händel, Mozart or Beethoven in his neoclassicist works, but what one finds there is much more than a simple "quotation". It is an authentic work that could have been written only by Stravinsky. The actuality of the ideas of A. F. Losev could be observed in the context of contemporary music and in the context of some of the recent cosmological theories such as theory of chaos. Observing them in this wider context enables one to estimate the importance of these ideas for the contemporary musical theory and especially aesthetics after the period of postmodernism. If we spare a moment to reflect upon at first sight baffling title *Music as a Subject of Logic*, we may notice that it yields more than just a speculative paradox - he keeps writing about music *qua* subject of logic emphasizing in the same time the irreconcilability of logic and music, the impossibility of levelling hyletic and rational, the aesthetic and logical. This paradox that needs not to be reiterated, but maintained, thought and lived. Moreover, we may ask what sort of "logic" is meant here?
The thinking of music became already at the beginning of the 20th century the focal point of phenomenological philosophy. It was partly due to the desire to discover the very being of music but no less the consequence of a belief that music, more than any other art form, lays a foundation for development and cognizance of a philosophical theory understood not just as a method but a comprehensive interpretation of the world. If pure musical being is constituted by an absolute interweaving of being and not-being, while the latter is to be understood in an Aristotelian fashion, not as absolute nothingness, but what-is-form-less, as me on (meonic), i.e., if the pure being of music is an absolute unity of logical and a-logical moment, it is legitimate to raise the issue about a possibility of any meaningful discourse about music. This means that the very connection between music and logic as well as philosophy (since logic is understood as an organon - instrument - of philosophy in all of its forms as formal, eidetic or hyletic) becomes the problem of logic and none the less the less of music; of logic, because it intends to import meaning into the world of things; of music, because it intends to be an expression, to broaden its own metaphorical discourse (be it tonal or a-tonal), to transfer something about the nature of the world from the sphere of indiscernable into a sphere of perceptible. Thus the question of how, what, why are being raised as well as those about the meaning of things that concern us most intimately.

During the last century we were witnessing the continuing desire to explain art as well as an incessant struggle for autonomy of the arts, that is, for a right to exist authentically being subjected to independent rules of its own. Hegel claimed that art is not the highest form of knowledge since it ceased to be taken for granted as in the time of ancient Greece, moreover, it is no more the place of the immediate manifestation of God (because in Christianity the transcendence of God does not express itself in the language of art). However, Hegel tried to find a place for art in the process of development of the absolute spirit taking its cognitive function into account. It is clear that today this cognitive side of art is not the determining side of it, at least not in an absolute sense. Art is competing neither with science nor with philosophy. It does not teach anything - it is not an expression of knowledge. However, again and again the question of its meaning is being raised. In spite of being discredited in comparison to other "more important" or "more useful" activities of the human mind, the voice of artists is becoming more resolute - they are the ones to determine the meaning of things. There are people who frequently appear on concerts of contemporary music although the number of those who are able to hear the music is insignificant.

It must be pointed out that if one looks at art from a practical point of view, one will find no "usefulness" whatsoever (except if there is a desire to manipulate people, which can be achieved by using cheaper and more efficacious means) therefore one might as well say that it should be abolished in the name of general happiness, by decree. However, sciences, especially fundamental ones, are in no better position, being seen from the same point of view. Art does not cease to exist in times of difficulty. "Utility" cannot serve as a criterion of meaning of existence of art in our times. Since art cannot be utilized, it is not an expression of dominant ideas. Authentic art cannot be used as an ideological weapon with which power justifies itself, art is now on its own, so there are chances for better, different future.

The aim of this essay is not to offer a full explication of the multiform relations between art and reality, it focuses on the essence of art and works of art and the analysis
of the heteroontological principle of works of art considering its logical (and alogical) ground. The question has been raised here as to the connection of art and logic in the context of analysis of music: is it possible to think art, music logically? If we do agree with the claim that music speaks to us meaning nothing – what kind of “language”, what kind of “meaning” do we talk about, and what kind of object is the one intended to by such a meaning? One may say that this is not the language of logic (logos apophantikos) that affirms or negates (regardless the question of truth), but a language of some other kind (logos apofatikos); but then – what kind of language is that and moreover, why do we talk about “language” at all? If what-is-logical is grounded by language – what is, then, language? Even if there was a preliminary answer to that question, the nature of meaning, specific as the one above as well as general would remain unclear, moreover, the nature and the cognoscibility of the object intended would remain in the dark.

We may suppose that music forms its own object and according to that its own language, but in that case the language of music could be “understandable only within music itself” – it would be a-logical, but by no means il-logical. If the logic of music could be determined from within, it would be possible to say that essentially the language of music is “logical” and that not only has a logic of music become possible but also music of logic as a separate realm of reality.

In any case, a certain determinateness must be presupposed as a (necessary) condition of intelligibility of any given object, that is any given thing has its own form, its eidos, property in virtue of which it can be distinguished from any other thing. Eidos is the form of essence of an object, its discernable shape, or, as Losev put it: eidos is "a meaningful image of essence of an object" (IV, 428; 495) and exactly this "imaginal" nature of object is the reason that makes the construction of eidos so difficult, as well as its intelligibility by means of reducing it to its constitutive elements.

As, by definition, the meaning of each thing, its basic property is identical to itself, the identity presupposes categories of motion and rest, since without them the identity of any given thing cannot be determined. It can be inferred from this that any given thing, taken as an individual, is "a uniqueness of rest-in-motion and self-identical difference" (IV, 508). If we accept this, bearing in mind the specific nature of Losev's exposition, which (as Losev himself admits) is parallel to the demonstrations found in Hegel's Science of Logic, we may find the statement that any given object of thought is being determined by the "rest-in-motion of self-affirming difference" intelligible, so that the identity of the object can be further described by means of the abovementioned categories. The categorial and structural interpretation of music can be based on the constitution of meaning of the object of music as a consequence of unification of apophatism and symbolism. This identity of any singular thing, its proper uniqueness which manifests itself as it has been described, is, in fact, its concept of meaning, or, as Losev in his earlier writings called it, its eidos.

If we take uniqueness to mean (a) self-affirming difference - we speak about a topos or, less strictly, about a geometrical shape. If, on the other hand, we take into consideration (b) its essential property of rest-in-motion, then we speak about plurality, or, less strictly, about number. Thus all the basic concepts have been introduced by means of which the musical form can be defined in the best Hegelian manner.

If eidos (understood as meaning, shape or number) can be defined only in relation to the non-eidetical or what is non-identical with it, then in this context we may define
coming-to-be itself *qua* Other that exists only in relation to meaning; and since coming-to-be is identical to coming-to-be of meaning it makes possible the coming-to-be of concept, shape and number. The unity thus obtained may be understood as magnitude: the identity in coming-to-be as space, and rest-in-motion in coming-to-be as time.

Any pure logical defining of meaning presupposes the abovementioned structure of concept, shape and number i. e. the structure of magnitude (taken as quantity) and of space and time. Entering into relation with a "surrounding" of any given thing, that is, with any thing meonic or alogical as to the given thing, or simply put, whatever a given thing is surrounded by *qua* background, not *logos* of its definition. The relation of the logical structure and its alogical otherness constitutes the expressibility of things and the explicable of concept and magnitude, shape and space, number and time.

The notion of Other signifies other-being, or not-being, which is not the same as pure nothingness, but the Other that determines any given thing by relating to its difference. Being is to be understood as monad, its unity as *nous* (or poetically put - the apollonic principle), while the otherness, the dyad, the multiplicity understood as chaos - or *me on*, matter (or poetically the Dyonisian principle). The relation of monad and dyad, *nous* (intellect) and *me on* (not-being), ether and primeval matter manifests itself as coming-to-be. Thus the dialectical triad is formed that is well-known from the philosophical systems of German idealism.

The difficulty is that the philosophies of Schelling and Hegel are but a reinterpretation of ancient Greek systems of Plato and Aristotle while it is all too soon forgotten that the peak of ancient philosophy is reached by Plotinus and Proclus.

We may ask ourselves: where will this line of thought take us? Does it make sense to raise the questions about the essence of music? I am trying to prove that after all the excuses of postmodernism, now, when postmodernism is a thing of the past, a re-reading of A. F. Losev's philosophy enables us to understand better the demands of our time. This philosophy may seem to us strange or old-fashioned, especially to those who read Hegel superficially (*since it is deeply influenced by the dialectical style of thinking of German idealism*) It is probably hard to understand that this philosophy comes from the future, hard to recognize the novelty of the ideas which could yield at least a part of the answer to the urgent problems of contemporary philosophy.

Losev's terminology was carefully chosen. The concept of form, which he used some time before Cassirer, and which is absolutely dominant in one period of his philosophy, is unfortunately somewhat clichéd, so that its freshness and depth is not easy to recognize. It is, in fact, so hard that, at first glance, the meaning of defining the musical form as a necessary constituent of any categorial relation seems unintelligible. His whole discourse aims at removing obstacles that may prevent insight into the poetic form of expression, of concept and magnitude without which it is impossible to understand that the artistic expression of shape and space is the form of painting and sculpture, and the artistic expression of number and time is the form of music.

This musical form is by no means a simple form whose simplicity prevents description. It is according to Losev three-levelled: 1) the first level is that of number, which manifests itself as individuality of rest-in-motion self identical difference, i. e. individuality taken as uniqueness understood as rest-in-motion 2) the second level is time, which could be defined as uniqueness of rest-in-motion of self-identical difference - but this uniqueness is not taken as alogical coming-to-be understood as rest-in-motion and finally 3) the third
level of the musical form defined as an expression of time being the uniqueness of rest-in-motion of self-identical difference given in alogical coming-to-be and interpreted as motion-in-rest.

The condition of understanding the structure so exposed is to analyze it considering its other-being qua the meonic correlate of the musical object with which the musical form is materially determined. Simply put: the musical form is being given its meaningful shape as its new form from its otherness (IV, 508-9). Exactly this makes possible the distinction between musical and mathematical object. At this stage it is necessary to go into a more detailed exposition of the multi-dependent connection between musical and mathematical objects that will enable us to understand the distinction more clearly. In contrast to general, so to speak poetic phrases about art and mathematics, it is necessary to go one step further in their distinguishing in order to gain a more specific meaning. Losev does that in the following way: a) it is a common characteristic of music and mathematics that neither of them refer to physical, physiological and psychological sphere but both are parts of the realm of meaning; furthermore, b) mathematical analysis is, in so far it is concerned with the interpretation of numbers, close to music (in so far the former is concerned with the interpretation of the meaning of numbers); finally c) the basis of music as well as mathematics is the pure member, as the ultimate ground and principle of all their constructions.

One should not forget what has been stated earlier (IV, 483) that the nature of music is sui generis - its being is motionless and ideal, complete and formed, transparent and simple as any mathematical axiom or theorem. Music is as far from psychology as mathematics is, due to its objectivity, but in the same time different from mathematics, in so far as mathematics deals with the construction of eidē as such, while music deals with construction of meonic essences (IV, 486).

However, despite the similarity, there are differences. Firstly, there is a gap between the forms of expressibility of musical and mathematical objects. The nature of musical object is a pure alogical relation of meaning and its other-being; moreover, number and time constitute the very foundation of music but taken as the living number due to its alogical, meonic properties.

The construction of the musical object is hyletic, having set principles which can be arrived at by deduction of the alogical component from the categories of meaning. On the other hand, mathematical object is expressed by its purely logical meaning (-related) component. In mathematics there is no construction of hyletic, anoetic logic of meaning - and there is no intention to describe the process of alogical coming-to-be of numbers. Mathematics aims at an exposition of purely logical structure of numbers considering both their logical and alogical properties.

One should bear in mind that mathematics constructs a) the number itself without representation (in its abstract form), and b) the abstract alogical number(s) in their coming-to-be, as well as, c) signs for all the types of numbers, but in a purely logical manner - without considering their expression. Music on the other hand focuses on the expression of numbers not as they are in themselves - not in their abstract logicity, but numbers as manifested in time.

As an art form, in contrast to mathematics, music constructs an ideal context of meaning focusing on its artistic expression. Losev rightly emphasizes that mathematical analysis is a logical construction of eidos while music is the hyletic construction of eidos.
Both of these presuppose a definite *eidos* and follow the eidetic construction in its meaningful abstractness. Music is ideal and similarly to mathematics it is different from any sensibilia. In the ideal sphere music is different, because it is hyletic (IV, 498).

We can infer that music is an hyletic-eidetic science and in the same time art as an expression of symbolic construction of objects made possible by hyletic logic. We may conclude that music is the identity of being and not-being, of logical and alogical determined by number and time. This highly synthetic formula of music proposed by A. F. Losev could be stated as follows: "Music is uniqueness of rest-in-motion of self-identical difference given in the form of alogic coming-to-be and understood as rest-in-motion of the latter, manifesting itself as a complete indivisible multitude, which is in fact a unity having for its consequence pure expressibility (in its connection to alogical components of otherness)." (IV, 512)

It may be said that this definition is not exactly "enthusiastic", on the other hand this is not an impressionistic, hazy, or poetic definition of music that is used to being given by artists themselves. Those who study the "scientific" side of music may not be content either. They may well be discontent with the shorter version of the definition, too, given by Losev: "Music is the pure alogically expressed objectness of life of numbers given as pure intelligence." In any case, one must notice Losev's intention to interpret music from music itself which is in accordance with the phenomenological method. Losev, I think rightly, says: "In order to understand a piece of music, I do not need any physics, physiology, psychology, or metaphysics - I need music and nothing else." (IV, 483) A. F. Losev constructs a metaphysical theory of music, although he tries to reject metaphysics by means of carefully chosen "more neutral" terms for his description. Here we may find some evidence that he was influenced by the first phase of Husserl's investigations - the phase of eidetic phenomenology. By phenomenology Losev means "investigations of objects in their substantiality, if the essential properties of a given object reveal a certain definite structure of the object" (IV, 584), emphasizing in the same time that "phenomenology has nothing whatever in common with theory" (phenomenology is not a theory, i.e. philosophy), it just describes the object in its substantiality (i.e. phenomenology is a method). This is in accordance with Husserl's statements from the period of *Dingvorlesungen* (1907), where he emphasizes that phenomenology is first and foremost a method. On the other hand, we find in Losev's writings some anticipation of the future of phenomenology as it became the only true philosophy, thus Losev writes: "Phenomenology is not a method, it is just intuiting things (objects)" (IV, 584).

In order to avoid degrading the status of music that follows from the claim that music is ineffable and alogical, presupposing in the same time the unquestionable validity of formal-logical relations, Losev justifies his interpretation through the foundation of hyletic logic. This has been the third step in his conception of development of logic after Aristotle's formal and Husserl's eidetic - logic that was influenced by Plotinus, Fichte, Schelling and Hegel. He demonstrates the application of hyletic logic on music and justifies it by showing the specific hyletic construction of an object of consciousness. What he aims at is making the logic of musical form explicit and through this to give a philosophical definition of the essence of music. Criticizing Schopenhauer Losev says that his writings may be unnecessarily overloaded by complicated style, albeit he clearly
dissociates himself from "any interpretation that would follow form formal-logical distinctions based on some "table of categories" (IV, 586).

What does he mean by that?

One must bear in mind that if it is possible to define alogical coming to be as \textit{eidos} (IV, 487), then it becomes clear why \textit{eidos} has been defined as "a streaming continuity of meaning-in-becoming with meaning itself", and that music is the "hyletic-meonic element of \textit{eidos}" and that hyletic \textit{eidos} is an expression of specially musical \textit{eidos}. Losev tries to show that music is the foundation of the world and that its form is objective but this objectivity is of a special kind, namely an objectivity that logically antecedes the world of things that is in constant change. The expression \textit{me on} denotes otherness, but not understood as nothingness, but as something that makes possible the distinguishing between different \textit{eidē}. Thus he emphasizes the alogical foundation of logic: logic is possible only in relation to its otherness, which is not a simple negation. Thus he contrasts logical with a-logical that is not il-logical as a simple negation or contradiction of "logical". Music is this alogical - based on a different foundation, as an eternal coming-to-be and eternal \textit{eidos}. Music is chaos, but in the same time the form of chaos. He then continues by saying: "there would be no life without music" (IV, 491). What means that without alogical there would be no expression of logical, which means that it is not possible to approach music by means of fixed formulae. The essence of music must be seen in the change of constant and unchangeable and thus shows how something paradoxical for the "common sense" makes the life of art possible.

If the meaningful structure of music can be reached only by means of categorial structural investigation (using terms like being, number, time, motion), then by such an analysis it is impossible to answer the question about the very matter these categories are referring to; beside the concept of being and time it is necessary for the investigation to introduce the primordial alogical level of \textit{eidos}. That precisely was the subject of A. F. Losev's treatise \textit{The dialectic of the artistic form} (1927).

In accordance with his understanding of music as \textit{coincidentia oppositorum} he undertakes an interpretation of the connection between concepts, music and reality influenced by Schopenhauer's doctrine of universals. Thus if concepts are \textit{universalia post rem}, music \textit{universalia ante rem}, and reality \textit{universalia in re} (IV, 260), then the governing position of music may be secured not only in the realm of art but also in the universe itself. Any piece of music, according to Losev, produces a certain amount of "philosophication" or mythologization, mythologization being understood as "intuiting the essences of images and concepts of our intellect" (IV, 653).

From the point of view of eidetic phenomenology it presupposes a true polyvalent conflict between rational and irrational, logical and alogical. If mythos represents the structure of spatio-temporal reality and if it aims at expressing the essence and not spatio-temporal events, then it is obvious that mythos is cognate to music in a sense that music does not intend to represent things but the extra-spatial nature of them. The concept of coming-to-be plays a special role in Losev's definition of essence of musical objects. I would not want to go into details considering his reasons to take music as the subject of analysis or to assign such a prominent place to it within the context of artistic expression in general. It would suffice to quote a statement of his: "The musical object differs in a very specific way from any other object of art, as it is not composed (constituted) of words, images, appearances or facts, but it is pure flux and pure coming-
The concept "coming-to-be" is to be understood here *qua* essence, that is taken independently of any objects and their properties. This coming-to-be is then in fact the becoming of meaning or number - it is, according to this philosopher, interior and original, so that in "coming-to-be" one should look for the origin - in ontological, not temporal sense - of number and meaning, thus coming-to-be is what-is-beyond-number and what-is-beyond-meaning (IV, 596). The ontological nature of this exposition should be kept in mind all the time while reading Losev's works. However, we must notice the important theological questions implicitly present in young A. F. Losev's treatises. Losev develops successfully a two-levelled discussion - musical and theologian and it is hard to resist the impression that both these discussions have a subject in common - and that is God viewed as a perfect musical form and conceptually as number. Losev emphasizes that number should be understood as a principle of hypostatized entity - expressed with the language of Plotinus (ENN. VI, 6, 15). Therefore, it must be concluded that Losev presents an onto-theo-logical analysis of music. This, then, presupposes a constant re-reading of his texts in the same way as music is to be listened or played. Great works of music continue to live only when being reproduced or listened to and thus appreciated all of their own.

A single move is needed now to lay bare the very foundations of Losev's doctrine. If it is a true, not empirical, musico-logy, this is what we learn: only through musico-logy *qua* theo-logy we may understand where music that we find in music scripts of great composers come from. We can confirm the thesis that the philosophy of A. F. Losev may be interpreted as originating from a single implicit point and developed in numerous ways in his early works. It is equally hard to resist the impression that the ulterior motive of his musical analyses are to be found in his tireless effort to think through the consequences of the Decrees of the Synode in Constantinople from 1351 which were accepted and defended by the author.*

*This is not intended against the interpretation, on the contrary, a unique opportunity has been given to the author to cope with age-old philosophical issues using phenomenology, which having shown itself as the only philosophical orientation at the beginning of the 20*th* century whose apparatus enables one to continue the dialogue between Eastern and Western Christianity, Eastern and Western philosophy.*